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- AbstractMajor global and national vaccine allocation guidelines urge planners to allocate vaccines in
ways that recognize, and ideally reduce, existing societal inequities within countries. However,
allocation plans of the US will be determined individually by each of the CDC’s 64
jurisdictions (states, the District of Columbia, five cities, and territories). We analyzed whether
jurisdictions have incorporated novel approaches to reduce inequity, based on plans published by
the CDC in early November 2020 (63 summaries [98% of all jurisdictions] and 47 full guidance
documents [73% of all, including all 50 states]).
Eighteen states adopted a novel proposal to use a disadvantage index to allocate vaccines
more equitably, for five types of equity goals: 1) to prioritize disadvantaged groups directly, 2) to
define priority groups in phased systems, 3) to plan tailored outreach and communication, 4) to
plan the location of dispensing sites and 5) to monitor uptake. Yet just over a third of all states,
and only half of the 16 states with the largest shares of disadvantaged populations—where
reducing inequity would be most urgent—pursue such goals.
While allocation frameworks are still evolving, the plans we analyzed mark important
historical and practical benchmarks, and could become firm policy when COVID-19 vaccines
are authorized and delivered. Vaccine roll-out poses unprecedented logistical and practical
challenges. To minimize the risk that ethics and social justice falls by the wayside in the busy
months to come, planners at the federal, state and local levels should carefully consider on what
grounds they decline to adopt equity measures that other planners deem important and feasible
for defining priority populations, designing allocation quotas, and just as critical, enabling, and
monitoring, uptake.
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Introduction
When a Covind-19 vaccine becomes available, all nations will face scarcity for months, with
greatest scarcity in lower-income countries. In the United States, recommendations from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practice (ACIP) will formally guide which population groups should receive safe and effective
Covid-19 vaccines. However, allocations will ultimately be determined by the CDC’s 64
immunization grantees (comprising 50 states, the District of Columbia, 5 large cities, and 8
territories: referred to below collectively as jurisdictions). The CDC requested its jurisdictions to
provide their plans by October 31, and it posted 63 summaries on November 8.1 We analyzed
these plans in short- and long-form to understand to what extent they reflected important
commitments to allocate vaccines in ways that reduce inequities and promote social justice.
Covid-19 vaccine allocation relates to two main processes, providing available doses to
jurisdictions according to their population or some other metric,2 and then, within jurisdictions,
to specific populations in meaningful sequence. Allocation frameworks seek to integrate a
multitude of factors, such as saving the most lives and limiting the spread of infections, and are
typically risk-based. Figure 1 shows how the ACIP’s plan (including vote Dec 1, 2020 on phase
1a) compares to one proposed earlier by the National Academies of Science, Engineering and
Medicine (NASEM),3 a group tasked by the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention and the
National Institutes of Health with assisting ACIP to develop equitable allocation guidance.
Figure 1: Priority groups under NASEM and ACIP frameworks
First144m people in the first 10 NASEM priority groups, accounting for overlap (note:
ACIP framework still evolving, showing 1/multiple options. Depiction: Ariadne Labs)
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Planning allocation across and within states presents unprecedented challenges and requires
strong vaccine infrastructure, including human resources and data systems. In addition to a
significant number of unknowns regarding the characteristics of vaccines, such as their longerterm effectiveness; capacity to prevent transmission as opposed to mainly preventing disease; and
adverse-effect profiles, there are complex logistics centered around shipping and distribution;
establishing handling and storage protocols; and ensuring administration and verification of
follow-up second doses (where required) and overall vaccine coverage. Countless tradeoffs will
likely need to be made among higher level aspirations regarding efficiency and equity, real-world
logistical and pragmatic constraints, and established pathways in which federal, state and local
health departments operate.4 In the overall rush to control the pandemic, implementation can
be as important as a vaccines’ efficacy.5 Even the most effective vaccines cannot curb SARSCoV-2 unless a sizable portion of the population is immunized, estimated at over 90 percent. A
central question is to what extent potentially frantic implementation will align—or stand in
conflict—with commitments to mitigate existing societal inequities, particularly those affecting
economically worse-off racial and ethnic minorities.
ACIP’s overarching ethical values for allocating initial supplies of Covid-19 vaccines note
that allocation strategies “should aim to both reduce existing disparities and to not create new
disparities”.6 The latter statement echoes a similar one from an earlier publication of ACIP’S
scientific and ethical principles, which explained that to “address the disproportionate burden of
COVID-19 disease in some racial/ethnic minority groups […] strategies for implementation
[should] reduce, rather than increase, health disparities in each phase of vaccine distribution”.7
This emphasis is also found in early academic commentary on the subject8 and influential highlevel policy advice by the NASEM,3 as well as of the World Health Organization’s WHO
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on immunization (SAGE).9
As figure 1 shows, to some extent, risk-based allocation frameworks such as the one
proposed by NASEM or ACIP already address inequities by, for example, proposing to offer
vaccines to people with multiple co-morbidities before otherwise healthy people. Due to the
social determinants of health, economically worse-off populations are generally less healthy.10-12
Therefore, a risk-based approach will allocate more vaccine sooner to economically worse-off
populations. Likewise, since an implication of structural racism is that minorities face reduced
economic mobility and account for larger shares of the economically worse-off,13-15 such an

(December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041

3

approach suggests that minority populations would be offered vaccines sooner. Similarly,
offering vaccines to essential workers earlier can have this consequence, as minorities comprise a
larger share of this workforce.3,6
Importantly, however, NASEM also recommended the use of an additional measure.
Within each phase of allocation, and in “each population group, vaccine access should be
prioritized for geographic areas identified through CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index [SVI] or
another more specific index.”2 An index such as SVI is tied to a geographic area, down to the
level of neighborhoods, and captures their relative average advantage and disadvantage through
a set of variables that go beyond income alone, and integrate, for example, educational
attainment and housing quality16 (and in the case of SVI also explicitly race and ethnicity).17
Such indices can therefore capture population groups for whom the protection offered by
vaccines is both more necessary and more valuable, as they are typically more dependent on
regular income, less able to socially distance, and more likely to contract and spread the
infection. In addition to public health and economic considerations, disadvantage indices matters
ethically, and can promote restorative justice.8,14,18 The NASEM notes that measures such as the
SVI incorporate “the variables that the committee believes are most linked to the
disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on people of color and other vulnerable populations.”
Concretely, the NASEM recommends setting aside 10% of federally available vaccines to be
added to the allocations that worse-off groups would otherwise be offered, proportionate to
population,19 under its risk-based framework. Complementing this effort, jurisdictions should
furthermore “ensure that special efforts are made to deliver vaccine to residents of highvulnerability areas (defined as the 25 percent highest in the state).”3 CDC staffers noted that the
SVI could be integrated into Tiberius, a newly developed software system intended to assist states
with vaccine allocation.16 To ascertain the extent to which emerging allocation guidance
incorporates statistical measures of disadvantage to reduce inequities, we therefore analyzed
jurisdictions’ initial frameworks.
Methods
We obtained summaries of all jurisdictions’ allocation plans published by November 8 on the
CDC’s dedicated website.1 Where a document linked to full guidance, we included it in the
analysis, and additionally obtained full plans by searching jurisdictions’ health department
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websites (Nov 7-14; archived copies available from the authors). Plans were analyzed using a
seven-item extraction tool (see Appendix 1) conceptualized by HS, MAW and LG and refined in
discussion with AS and RW, eliciting:
1. Whether jurisdictions intended to use an index of disadvantage for prioritization of worse-off
population groups or other purposes;
2. Insofar as prioritization of worse-off is planned, what share of what population should be
prioritized, and to what extent;
3. Whether plans envisaged the use of the newly developed Tiberius platform.
Two authors (AD and HW) each analyzed and tabulated half of all plans, and another (ES)
verified all data entry. HS, ES, HW, and AD resolved any differences in data capture, which
were marginal, given the simplicity of the extraction tool.
Results
We obtained a total of 63 summaries (98.4% of all jurisdictions) and 47 full guidance documents
(73.4% of all jurisdictions, including all states). Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize the findings.
Eighteen jurisdictions (all states, none are cities) refer to the SVI; California developed its own
metric. A range of distinct uses of disadvantage measures emerged from the data, which we
describe in more detail below. Twenty-four jurisdictions plan on using Tiberius (which may
include prioritized allocations to worse-off areas, as captured by the SVI), including 15 that do
not otherwise indicate that they intend to use SVI for other purposes that might benefit worse-off
groups more.
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Figure 2: Jurisdictions’ use of statistical measures of disadvantage for prioritizing vaccine
allocation, use of Tiberius allocation software system – geographical depiction

Note: In states shown in bold, more than 25% of the population are in the US’ worse-off quartile, as measured on
the SVI applied nationally. See Appendix 2.
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Table 1: Jurisdictions’ use of statistical measures of disadvantage for prioritizing vaccine allocation, use of Tiberius allocation software system
Reference to Disadvantage Index
Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI)
18

States (50)

Other
1

(AL, AZ, FL,
IN, LA, MA,
MI, NJ, NM,
NY, ND, OH,
OR, RI, SC,
TN, VT, WA)

(CA)

0

0

0

0

DC + Cities (6)

Territories (7)

None
31
(AR, AK,
CO, CT, DE,
GA, HI, ID,
IL, IA, KS,
KY, MD,
ME, MN,
MO, MS,
MT, NE,
NV, NH,
NC, OK, PA,
SD, TX, UT,
VA, WI, WV,
WY)
6
(DC, Chicago
Houston,
NYC,
Philadelphia,
San Antonio)
7
(Guam,
Marshall Isl.,
Micronesia,
N. Mariana
Isl., Palau,
Puerto Rico,
US Virgin
Isl.)

prioritizing
worse-off
using SVI
7

Use of Disadvantage Index for…
defining priority planning outreach/
groups, possibly communication to
also prioritizing ensure uptake (during
groups
scarcity or after)
10
3

(CA, IN,
LA, MI,
ND, OH,
TN)

(AL, FL, MA,
NM, NY, OR,
RI, SC, VT,
WA)

0

0

monitor
planning ing
dispen- uptake
sing sites

Use of Tiberius
Yes
No

1

1

23

27

(AZ, VT, WA)

(NJ)

(OH)

(AL, AK,
AZ, AR,
CO, DE,
ID, IN,
KY, ME,
MS, NV,
NJ, NM,
NC, ND,
OR, PA,
RI, SD,
TN, WI,
WY

(CA, CT, FL,
GA, HI, IL,
IA, KS, LA,
MD, MA, MI,
MN, MO,
MT, NE, NH,
NY, OH, OK,
SC, TX, UT,
VT, VA, WA,
WV)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

6
(DC, Chicago,
San Antonio,
Houston,
NYC,
Philadelphia)
1
6
(Puerto
(Guam,
Rico)
Marshall Isl.,
Micronesia, N.
Mariana Isl.,
Palau, US
Virgin Islands)

Note: In states shown in bold, more than 25% of the population are in the US’ worse-off quartile, as measured on the SVI applied nationally. See Appendix 2.
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Among the 18 states that refer to the SVI, five different purposes can be distinguished (some
jurisdictions indicate the intention to pursue more than a single goal; see Table 2 for an overview,
and Appendix 1 for the full extracted data for further context).
In direct alignment with NASEM’s recommendation, seven states indicate expressly that
measures of disadvantage can help address social injustice in allocation planning (CA, IN, ND,
NY, OH, VT, TN). The most specific articulation is found in Tennessee, which mirrors
NASEM’s approach at the state level and proposes to reserve 10% of its allocation for high SVI
areas. Eighty-five percent would be allocated to counties by population, and 5% “equitably.”
Ten states plan to use the SVI to identify priority populations (AL, FL, MA, NM, NY,
OR, RI, SC, VT, WA). North Dakota contemplates using the SVI for a particular population
group (to “ensure equity in the number of doses Tribal healthcare providers receive”), and NY
notes the goal of identifying “which geographic areas of the state may derive a greater public
health benefit to receiving early vaccine. This may include areas with higher historical burden of
disease or areas that have the highest prevalence of COVID-19.”
Four states (AZ, NJ, VT, WA) plan to use the SVI for purposes distinct from identifying
priority groups, or determining the quantity of vaccines offered to a group. These states note the
SVI’s utility for promoting uptake, for example, planning locations of dispensing sites (NJ) or
outreach or communication strategies (AZ, VT, WA).
Finally, Ohio intends to use the SVI “both a priori when deciding geographic distribution
of vaccines, and post-hoc to ensure that state’s goals to protect the most-at-risk and vulnerable
Ohioans are upheld.”
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Table 2: Central verbatim sections illuminating states’ approach to drawing on statistical measures of
disadvantage in allocating vaccines in situations of scarcity and non-scarcity
(Note: regular font indicates that the text comes from the summary provided to CDC, italics that the text is found in the
states’ full guidance)
Prioritize worse off using SVI
CA
Identifying populations and communities that have been disproportionately impacted by COVID-19 and has
developed a health equity metric to help guide continuing efforts to address disparities.
The equity metric is designed to reduce cases in the most disproportionately impacted communities, as defined by the census tracts in the
lowest quartile of the Healthy Places Index within larger counties, and as defined by population and geography by the local health
departments in smaller counties (where census tracts cannot be used).
IN
The CDC Social Vulnerability Index will be reviewed during the allocation process and applied if there is a limited vaccine during
this phase. A document that identifies the SVI and estimated counts for comorbid conditions per county will assist in targeted
allocation, distribution, and communication during this phase. Counties with higher SVIs may receive an increased allocation per
population.
LA
In each population group, OPH will use CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) or another more specific index, as needed to
prioritize for geographical areas for vaccine access.
MI
MDHHS Division of Immunization will initially allocate COVID19 vaccine to hospitals and health systems and
Local Health Departments (LHD) that can manage a large allocation of Vaccine A for administration to health
care providers. Thereafter, allocations will be made to each of the health jurisdictions within Michigan for
prioritization to community providers who have the ability to vaccinate the priority groups. Allocations are
determined based on several factors including the social vulnerability index and population.
After initial allocations to hospitals, allocations will be made to each of the 45 health jurisdictions based on several factors including
the social vulnerability index and population. LHDs will then use the relationships they have built with the community to allocate out
additional amounts of vaccine to the providers in their community who are able to reach the vulnerable populations.
The ND Advisory Committee on COVID-19 Vaccine Ethics may choose to utilize CDC’s vulnerability index when allocating
ND
vaccine, which may ensure equity in the number of doses Tribal healthcare providers receive.
OH In addition, vaccine administration will be assessed using the CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index both a priori when deciding
geographic distribution of vaccines and post-hoc to ensure that state’s goals to protect the most-at-risk and vulnerable Ohioans are
upheld.
After careful review of the CDC Playbook and the National Academies’ of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine’s Framework for
TN
Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine and discussion with the Stakeholder Group, TDH leadership, and the Unified
Command Group, the following structure has been adopted for the allocation and prioritization of COVID-19 vaccines:
Allocation:
• Ten percent of the State’s allocation of COVID-19 vaccines will be reserved by the State for use in targeted areas with high Social
Vulnerability Index (SVI) values.
• Five percent of the State’s allocation of COVID-19 vaccines will be distributed equitably among all 95 counties.
• Eighty-five percent of the State’s allocation of COVID-19 vaccines will be distributed among all 95 counties based upon their
populations.
Define priority groups, possibly also prioritize
AL
The Data Group will use all the available databases used for COVID-19 surveillance (including the Social
Vulnerabilities Index), and CDC provided databases to identify, estimate the numbers, and where they are
located.
FL
The Department’s Office of Minority Health and Health Equity has been engaged in vaccination planning and
existing networks and data will be utilized to inform these efforts. Social vulnerability indexes are available in
GIS platforms and communities with health disparities have been identified
MA …will identify and prioritize critical populations for vaccination following federal guidance . . In addition, The
Office of Population Health (OPH) manages the contract with Boston University School of Public Health (BUSPH) for Social
Vulnerability Index (SVI) analysis and related mapping support. Within OPH, the Office of Health Equity (OHE) works to
address social determinants so all Massachusetts residents can attain their full health potential. […]using the CDC’s Social
Vulnerability Index to assess the interaction of these forces [occupation, housing type, school enrollment, race/ethnicity, primary
language, health care access, co-morbidities, socioeconomic factors ] on the likelihood members of critical populations will accept, seek,
and be able to access COVID-19 vaccine.
Working with our collaborative Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) analytic and mapping partner, the Boston University School of
Public Health, maintain superior ability to map these workforce resources at a granular level to inform planning.
NM NMDOH will also use numerous data sources, including the CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index to identify
populations at highest risk.
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NY

OR

Once the vaccine is first approved for use, New York State will use up-to-date data to determine which geographic areas of the state
may derive a greater public health benefit to receiving early vaccine. This may include areas with higher historical burden of disease or
areas that have the highest prevalence of COVID-19. In addition, individual factors for hospitals and nursing homes will be
considered including cases per facility in prior 14 days, and vulnerability index of population served. New York will also consider
whether the vaccine can be used effectively as a potential outbreak interruption strategy and if so, what the criteria will be.
Options for mapping population data (including Tiberius, Tableau and ArcGIS) are actively being explored in conjunction with
mapping of CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) to identify overlap and potential areas of greatest need.

The MV Workgroup will leverage a range of data sources to estimate numbers of critical populations …. Data sources consulted in
the process of quantifying and locating members of critical populations include (though are not limited to):
- Federal agency data to CMS; - CDC - Social Vulnerability Index
SC
DHEC is closely monitoring guidance put forth by the CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), the National
Institutes of Health, and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) regarding identified populations
of focus for COVID-19 vaccination. Other resources include:
• CDC's Social Vulnerability Index, which accounts for natural and human-caused disasters and disease outbreaks.
VT
The Immunization Program will work closely with all COVID-19 vaccination providers and target settings to
ensure equitable access to the COVID-19 vaccine. Vaccine allocation will be based on population data, with
attention to critical populations. Vaccine administration data from the Immunization Registry will be monitored
and reviewed by geographic location. Vaccine doses administered by enrolled sites will also be monitored and
redistribution will be required. The Immunization Program is collaborating with the Health Operations Center’s
Health Equity and Community Engagement Team to ensure access for people who are disproportionately
affected by COVID-19, including Black, Indigenous and people of color. GIS mapping and Social Vulnerability
Indices will be employed to identify areas with limited access and direct distribution efforts.
WA The use of social vulnerability indexes and maps will also inform how critical populations and sub-populations
can be reached equitably and will inform allocation decisions under supply constraints. We will use tools such as
Washington Tracking Network Information and CDC Social Vulnerability Index to identify Census tracts in
Washington that have higher health inequities overall and to map other relevant social determinants of health,
such as overcrowded housing, poverty, disability, or health insurance coverage.
Plan outreach/communication to ensure uptake (during scarcity or after)
AZ
…allocate vaccine for higher-risk individuals, health care professionals, and other essential workers as
recommended by VAPAC.
There may be areas with limited providers, a high social vulnerability index (SVI), vaccine hesitancy or other
factors that lead to lower vaccine uptake. In these areas, ADHS plans to work with local partners to develop
targeted messaging and mobile POD vaccination strategies to encourage vaccination
…ADHS will utilize the SVI to identify communities that may need enhanced support before, during and after disasters.
VT
The Immunization Program will work closely with all COVID-19 vaccination providers and target settings to
ensure equitable access to the COVID-19 vaccine. Vaccine allocation will be based on population data, with
attention to critical populations. Vaccine administration data from the Immunization Registry will be monitored
and reviewed by geographic location. Vaccine doses administered by enrolled sites will also be monitored and
redistribution will be required. The Immunization Program is collaborating with the Health Operations Center’s
Health Equity and Community Engagement Team to ensure access for people who are disproportionately
affected by COVID-19, including Black, Indigenous and people of color. GIS mapping and Social Vulnerability
Indices will be employed to identify areas with limited access and direct distribution efforts.
WA The use of social vulnerability indexes and maps will also inform how critical populations and sub-populations can be reached
equitably and will inform allocation decisions under supply constraints. We will use tools such as Washington Tracking Network
Information and CDC Social Vulnerability Index to identify Census tracts in Washington that have higher health inequities overall
and to map other relevant social determinants of health, such as overcrowded housing, poverty, disability, or health insurance coverage.
Plan dispensing sites
Social Vulnerability Index (SVI)3 review to determine location of PODS [points of dispensing]
NJ
Monitor uptake
OH In addition, vaccine administration will be assessed using the CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index both a priori when deciding
geographic distribution of vaccines and post-hoc to ensure that state’s goals to protect the most-at-risk and vulnerable Ohioans are
upheld.
RI
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Limitations and Discussion
Jurisdictions were asked to publish allocation plans under an extremely tight schedule with just
30 days between the official request and the deadline. While 63 provided summaries at the time
of CDC’s publication, and fuller allocations plans were available for all states, they were not
available concurrently for 16 jurisdictions. Many aspects regarding implementation that affect
these plans, such as cold-storage needs, are only now becoming concrete, as the Food and Drug
Administration determines which vaccines to authorize.5 In this sense, currently available plans
offer only a snap-shot of evolving guidance. Moreover, using a statistical measure of
disadvantage is not the only way of reducing disparities, and not every intended use might have
been noted in the initial allocation plans. At the same time, the NASEM’s recommendation that
such a measure is called for to address Covid-19’s unjust impact—and that it should be used in
addition to a risk-based framework with specific phases and specific subpopulations—was
patently clear. Likewise, every jurisdiction planner was likely aware of the vastly disparate Covid19 impacts across racial and ethnic groups, in terms of unemployment, hospitalizations and
deaths,18,20 and the concurrent national reckoning with racial justice, which also prompted the
NASEM’s proposal. In this regard, the initial plans also represent an important historical
benchmark, offering practical templates as well as a baseline measure of how pressing the need to
reduce inequities and promote social justice is perceived to be, in relation to other important
priorities.
Four main themes emerged from the findings: a) variation in the adoption of SVI and
related measures, b) the degree of clarity about the likely impact of such measures on different
dimensions of disparities, c) plans for the uptake of the Tiberius software, and d) the importance
of disparate impact monitoring.
A little over a third of states engaged directly with the novel proposal to utilize statistical
measures of disadvantage to address social justice. Among the 16 states that have more than
25% of their population falling under the worst-off SVI quartile nationwide (see Appendix 2),
half (n=8) plan on using the SVI: two with the goal of directly prioritizing worse-off groups (CA,
LA), five to capture priority populations (and possibly prioritize further; AL, FL, NM, NY, SC),
and one to draw on SVI for designing outreach/communication strategies once scarcity ends
(AZ). Among the six jurisdictions with more than 30% worse-off (NM, DC, CA, NY, MS, TX),
only two (CA, NY) plan on using the SVI, and four signal no such express intention at this point.
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To reiterate, the use of a disadvantage index is not the only way in which equity could be
addressed. We do not mean to suggest that the data presented here necessarily cast doubt on the
commitments to equitable vaccine allocation of jurisdictions that currently do not indicate using
such an index. But scrutiny of their efforts to explore—and more importantly implement and
monitor—ways of allocating vaccines in ways that reduce inequities will likely increase. Note, for
example, that even if all states were to set aside a 10% reserve of their allotted vaccines as
additional amounts for those in the worst-off quartiles, under the NASEM framework, worse-off
minorities would be offered vaccines below their population share until the beginning of phase 3,
with the exception of the very first phase (see figure 1, Appendix 2, analogous simulation for the
final ACIP framework ongoing).2
The extent to which a disadvantage index will directly shape social justice-based
prioritization is essential to understand even if at this point it is somewhat unclear. However, the
state of Tennessee stands out in its clarity regarding the planned increases in the numbers of
courses reserved for worse-off groups. The state proposes to reserve 10% of its allocation for high
SVI areas (in addition to what these areas would receive based on population), although it would
still need to be specified what population segment would be offered the extra doses—given the
direct alignment with the NASEM’s overall recommendation, likely the state’s worst-off quartile
(alternatively, a more continuous approach could avoid inequities between, for example two
census tracts that are marginally below and marginally above the 25% threshold). Tennessee
also highlights the need to address intra-state variations by allocating 85% proportionate to
population, but reserving a further 5% “equitably” (which, presumably, would be based on a
measure like SVI, poverty measures, or another standard that operationalizes a sense of need).
An important use of the SVI relates to the expression among vaccine workers that
“Vaccines don’t save lives. Vaccinations save lives.”21 In the present context, this means that
grouping worse-off populations in higher priority groups, or setting aside larger shares of vaccines
alone, can be meaningless for reducing inequity if these steps are not matched with genuine
efforts to ensure populations are also willing and able to accept vaccines. Outreach and effective
communication are even more crucial if states make no additional efforts at prioritizing worse-off
groups across phases or through larger allocated amounts. Yet, currently, only 4 states (AZ, NJ,
VT, WA) describe that they plan to use the SVI for planning the location of dispensing sites, or
communication and outreach efforts. None of the states with more than 30% of its population

(December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041

12

falling under the nationally worst-off quartile plan such uses, and only one the 16 states with
more than 25% worse-off does so (AZ; while the state recognizes the SVI’s utility in this regard, it
currently indicates no plans to use it for any other purpose).
Using a rigorous measure of disadvantage for promoting uptake is of great importance in
view of the overall policy that jurisdictions will only receive new vaccine allocations once already
received batches have been distributed.22 While entirely reasonable in its motivation to minimize
wastage, an unintended consequence of this policy could be that jurisdictions might prioritize
regions where uptake is swift and virtually guaranteed, and conversely, might deprioritize
locations with real or anticipated lower uptake.
Such an outcome would recreate the kind of dynamics that the NASEM sought to
address with its proposal to use the SVI to mitigate the consequences of structural racism.
Interpreting low vaccine uptake in, for example, communities with predominantly Black
populations as expressing that these groups might simply not be interested in vaccines would be
based on an overly simplistic understanding of autonomy. In planning outreach and
communication activities, history matters. It is therefore crucial to be aware that rather than
simply indicating a personal preference, vaccine hesitancy has different reasons that require
different responses,23 and can moreover be an entirely rational expression of lacking trust in the
healthcare system and in government. Egregious historical ethical violations such as the Tuskegee
study cast a long shadow in the collective memory of, particularly, Black communities, and
ongoing experiences of structural racism in healthcare and beyond likewise undermine trust.24-26
States with larger shares of worse-off communities of color and others not engaged with the
healthcare system would therefore be well advised to explore similar uses of the SVI as intended
by AZ, NJ, VT, and WA, particularly given that the incentive structures governing the
deployment of new tranches of vaccines currently favor prioritizing allocations to geographic
areas with the swiftest uptake.
On a practical note (with normative implications), approximately one-third (n=24) of
jurisdictions indicate they plan to use the Tiberius Platform, including 15 that do not signal any
other use of the SVI. This trend also matters normatively. Uniform adoption of a centralized
platform to inform state plans can have advantages in, for example, consistent implementation of
SVI-based prioritization, and transparency around the near-real-time data being used for
decisions (e.g., re-distribution of doses at the local level). It might be puzzling why about two-
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thirds of jurisdictions turn down the offer of a free platform with defined application. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that novelty; concerns around the opacity of data integration; and about
alignment of data representation with state-level data sets are part of the explanation. Improving
transparency appears a desirable first step towards greater efficiency and operational
effectiveness, and, possibly, more uniform use of adjusting allocations with disadvantage
measures.
Finally—and directly related to the above points regarding variations in adopting SVI;
questions about the impact that different types of adoptions will have; and use of Tiberius—
planners in Ohio ought to be commended for expressly planning to use a disadvantage index not
only for allocation purposes, but also for monitoring uptake. Such initiatives—for example, by
assessing coverage rates by SVI deciles—can support disparate impact monitoring, a legal
concept focused on determining whether policies negatively affect a protected group, even if they
do not have that express intention, or directly use information about that group.25-27 Ideally,
given the salience of the goal of reducing inequities, the extent to which vaccines reach worse-off
groups would be monitored at the federal level (and would appear to be feasible to implement,
were a platform such as Tiberius more acceptable to jurisdictions). However, pragmatically,
disparate impact monitoring is best conducted—and planned for, from the outset—at the state
level, for it is here that vaccine redistributions, along with intensifications of outreach,
communication or concentration of dispensing sites efforts, would need to be adjusted.
Conclusion
The nation faces an unprecedented logistical and social justice challenge in allocating vaccines
under scarcity in the next half year or so. (At the global level, we anticipate scarcity for much
longer periods of time, especially in low- and middle-income countries). Overall, the better-off
white majority will be able to live and work socially distanced for a few months more with
reasonable inconvenience. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the most disadvantaged
communities, including, particularly, racial and ethnic minorities, who are a greater risk, and for
whom a vaccine is far more important. Jurisdictions should explore to the fullest extent the
potential of using statistical measures of disadvantage, alongside other options, to allocate
vaccines equitably.3,8
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The tasks at hand are urgent and complex. But we are also at a point where social justice must
become central, rather than continue to be peripheral. There is still time for jurisdiction
planners to play a direct role in changing the course of a troubling historical trajectory.
Establishing allocation frameworks that increase the chances of more disadvantaged
communities—and particularly those of color—to be offered a vaccine can help to reduce
inequity, and can be one way of mitigating the consequences of past, and in many ways still
ongoing,20,24-27 wrongs.
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Appendix 1
Complete data extraction tool: References to the use of statistical measures of disadvantage, and the Tiberius platform,
in the CDC’s jurisdictions initial allocation frameworks (based on a) summaries of all jurisdictions’ allocation plans
published by November 8 on the CDC’s dedicated website,1 and b) full versions, which were either obtained website
links within the short version, or obtained through additional searches on jurisdictions’ health department websites
(Nov 7-14; archived copies available from the authors).

#=not
mentioned

1
Refers to
disadvantage
index?

Green fonts:
full version

(SVI, ADI,
other:
STATE
WHICH)

Alabama

SVI

1a
Use Index for:
- identifying
- prioritizing
-[other=note]

1b
Verbatim text

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

The Data
Group will use
all the
available
databases used
for COVID19 surveillance
(including the
Social
Vulnerabilities
Index), and
CDC
provided
databases to
identify,
estimate the
numbers, and
where they are
located.

2
Magnitude and
mechanisms for any
prioritization are (eg
10% of state
allocation for worse
off)

2a
Verbatim
text

No

#

3
Plans on
using
Tiberius?

3a
Verbatim
text

(yes,no)

Yes

ADPH will
also utilize
the Health
and
Human
Services’
(HHS)
Operation
Warp
Speed
(OWS)
Tiberius
web
microplann
ing tool to
assist with
allocations
during all
phases.
ADPH will
use
Tiberius to
identify the
number
and
location of
COVID-19
critical
populations
down to
the county
level,
including
maps.
ADPH has
created a
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Data
Group to
analyze
and verify
the data in
Tiberius.
Alaska

#

#

#

No

#
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Yes

Critical
infrastructu
re data are
being
gathered
from
various
entities
through
Alaska’s
critical
infrastructu
re
workforce.
These data
will
improve
the utility
of Tiberius.
Data
sources
include (but
are not
limited to)
the
following:
Alaska
Departmen
t of Labor
and
Workforce
Developme
nt, Alaska
Division of
Insurance,
Alaska
Division of
Healthcare
Facilities
(i.e.,
healthcare
licensing),
Alaska
Native
Tribal
Health
Consortiu
m, Alaska
Pharmacist
s

19

Association
, Chronic
Disease
and Health
Promotion,
Epidemiolo
gy, Public
Health
Nursing,
and Alaska
State
Hospital
and
Nursing
Home
Association
(ASHNHA)
.

Arizona

SVI

Plan outreach/
communication
to ensure
uptake (during
scarcity or
after)

During the
initial phase of
the
vaccination
campaign,
ADHS and
the local
allocators will
utilize federal,
state, and local
data sources to
estimate
critical
populations
and allocate
vaccine for
higher-risk

No

#
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Yes

The Alaska
Immunizati
on
Program
will use
Tiberius to
assist with
microplann
ing to
ensure
there is
equitable
access to
COVID-19
vaccination
services
throughout
all areas
within the
state.
ADHS may
also
leverage
staffing
offered by
CDC to
support
Tiberius,
VTrckS,
VAMS,
and other
systems
used to
manage the
vaccine
response.

20

individuals,
health care
professionals,
and other
essential
workers as
recommended
by VAPAC
There may be
areas with
limited
providers, a
high social
vulnerability
index (SVI),
vaccine
hesitancy or
other factors
that lead to
lower vaccine
uptake. In
these areas,
ADHS plans
to work with
local partners
to develop
targeted
messaging and
mobile POD
vaccination
strategies to
encourage
vaccination.
In addition,
the
Department
worked with
partners at
Arizona State
University
(ASU) to
identify
priority areas
with
individuals at
high risk for
COVID-19
complications
using two
different
assessments of
risk - one
utilizing
Hospital
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Discharge
histories and
20 diagnosis
codes that are
well
documented
in the
scientific
literature as
associated
with elevated
risk of poor
COVID
outcomes. The
second
approach was
conducted
using a
COVID
vulnerability
index
developed by
ASU. It looks
at many
factors, such
things as
poverty,
ethnicity, that
has been
shown to be
statistically
associated
with elevated
COVID
death,
diagnosis, or
hospitalization
. This analysis
identified 31
high risk
Primary Care
Areas (PCAs)
that contain
an estimated
54% of all
persons in
Arizona who
would be at
elevated risk of
poorer
COVID19
outcomes.
These areas
have been
prioritized
throughout
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the response
for targeted
communicatio
ns, social
media
listening,
increased
testing and
vaccine
resources

Arkansas

#

#

ADHS will
utilize the SVI
to identify
communities
that may need
enhanced
support
before, during
and after
disasters.
The ADH will
leverage the
Federal data
platform
known as
Tiberius and
work closely
with the
Arkansas State
Data Center
at the
University of
Arkansas at
Little Rock to
update
Arkansas
population
data by county
and zip code
to continually
assess
vaccination
rollout efforts.
This data will
allow us to
overlay critical
populations
with health
care providers
using geomapping

No

#
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Yes

The ADH
will
leverage
the Federal
data
platform
known as
Tiberius
and work
closely with
the
Arkansas
State Data
Center at
the
University
of Arkansas
at Little
Rock to
update
Arkansas
population
data by
county and
zip code to
continually
assess
vaccination
rollout
efforts.
This data
will allow
us to
overlay
critical
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populations
with health
care
providers
using geomapping.
California

CA Health
Equity
Metric

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

Additionally,
California is
identifying
populations
and
communities
that have been
disproportiona
tely impacted
by COVID-19
and has
developed a
health equity
metric to help
guide
continuing
efforts to
address
disparities.

No

#

No

#

The equity
metric is
designed to
reduce cases in
the most
disproportiona
tely impacted
communities,
as defined by
the census
tracts in the
lowest quartile
of the Healthy
Places Index
within larger
counties, and
as defined by
population
and geography
by the local
health
departments
in smaller
counties
(where census
tracts cannot
be used).
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Chicago

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Colorado

#

#

#

No

#

Yes

The GIS
Unit is
already
involved in
mapping
critical
populations
and has the
expertise to
assist with
spatial
analyses to
identify
where
additional
focus may
be needed
to recruit
providers
for
vaccination
efforts.
Colorado
would also
be
interested
in
comparing
the
population
estimates in
the
CDC’s
Tiberius
mapping
application
to ensure
we are
using the
best
available
data to
inform
provider
recruitment
.
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Connecticut

#

#

Several data
sources are
being used to
identify
populations in
Connecticut at
high risk for
COVID-19,
and DPH will
utilize
mapping tools
to provide
visual
representation
of target
populations
when the data
is finalized.
After applying
recommendati
ons and with
visual data,
DPH will
coordinate
with these
target groups,
coordinate
vaccinators,
and identify
for COVID19 vaccine
administration
setting for
Phases 1-A, 1B, and 2.

No

#

No

#

Delaware

#

#

#

No

#

Yes

The
Immunizati
on
Program
will use the
Health and
Human
Services
(HHS)
operating
system
called
“Tiberius”
to allow the
Vaccine
Planning
Group to
obtain
vaccine
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data for
Delaware
and target
critical
populations
and work
groups to
ensure the

District of
Columbia

#

#

The estimate
of Critical
Workforce
and
Populations
for Phase 1 of
COVID-19
Vaccine
Distribution
was created
using available
information
from DC
government
agencies, local
community
partners,
CDC’s
Behavioral
Risk Factor
Surveillance
System
(BRFSS) for
the District,
and DC’s
Health and
Medical
Coalition
Healthcare
Workforce
Survey.

No

#

No

vaccine
allocated to
Delaware is
being used
effectively.
#

Florida

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

The
Department’s
Office of
Minority
Health and
Health Equity
has been
engaged in
vaccination

No

#

No

#
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planning and
existing
networks and
data will be
utilized to
inform these
efforts. Social
vulnerability
indexes are
available in
GIS platforms
and
communities
with health
disparities
have been
identified.
Florida has a
well-integrated
public health
and
emergency
management
system that
allows the
state to
identify at-risk
populations
and personnel
across multiple
disciplines,
provide robust
geographic
information
system (GIS)
mapping
capabilities,
and
communicate
with persons
from various
disciplines
through an
integrated
emergency
management
structure.
The
Department’s
Office of
Minority
Health and
Health Equity
has been
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engaged in
vaccination
planning and
existing
networks and
data will be
utilized to
inform these
efforts. Social
vulnerability
indexes are
available in
GIS platforms
and
communities
with health
disparities
have been
identified.

Georgia

#

#

DPH
Immunization
Program will
utilize a
combination
of existing
national, statewide, and
local data
sources;
engagement of
communitybased
organizations,
academic
institutions,
and state
agencies;
mapping,
modeling, and
forecasting;
and
surveillance
data to
identify critical
and priority
populations.
Information
collected on
critical
populations
will be
compiled into
a Critical

No

#
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Populations
database
maintained by
DPH.

Guam

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Hawaii

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Houston

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Idaho

#

#

DHW’s
Immunization
and
Preparedness
Programs are
working
together to
develop plans
and gather
input and data
from state,
local, and
tribal
government
agencies to
identify,
estimate
numbers of,
and locate
critical
populations.

No

#

Yes

The
Immunizati
on
Program
plans to use
the
Departmen
t of Health
and
Human
Services’
Operation
Warp
Speed
Tiberius
Platform
(“Tiberius”
) to aid in
COVID-19
vaccine
distribution
planning,
tracking,
modeling,
and
analysis to
support a
successful
vaccination
campaign.
In addition,
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the
immunizati
on
programis
developing
a tool for
calculating
vaccine
dose
allocations
to assist
with
ensuring
equitable
distribution
of vaccine
for priority
populations

Illinois

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Indiana

SVI

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

Data Advisory
Group:
Explored
creative data
resources and
compiled
Indianaspecific data
for critical
populations.

No

#

Yes

The IDOH
will use
Tiberius as
a
visualizatio
n tool for
allocations,
vaccine
administrat
ion data
monitoring,
and
transparenc
y

The CDC
Social
Vulnerability
Index will be
reviewed
during the
allocation
process and
applied if
there is a
limited
vaccine during
this phase. A
document that
identifies the
SVI and
estimated
counts for
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Estimates
of the
identified
critical
populations
and critical
infrastructu
re
workforce
are based
on accurate
information
from
population
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comorbid
conditions per
county will
assist in
targeted
allocation,
distribution,
and
communicatio
n during this
phase.
Counties with
higher SVIs
may receive
an increased
allocation per
population.

representati
ve
organizatio
ns, industry
leaders,
and public
opensource
data.
IDOH will
also
leverage
the federal
HHS data
manageme
nt system,
Tiberius.
These
accurate
estimates
are
leveraged
to
minimize
potential
waste of
vaccine,
constituent
products,
and
ancillary
supplies.

Iowa

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Kansas

#

#

Critical
populations
and
infrastructure
will be
identified and
estimated
through use of
the most
recent
Behavioral
Risk Factor
Surveillance
System
(BRFSS) data,

No

#

No

#
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American
Community
Survey (ACS)
data, and
ESRI
Community
Analyst data.
Critical
populations to
be gathered
through these
data sets
include: racial
and ethnic
minority
groups;
individuals 65
years and
older;
individuals
with
disabilities;
individuals
that are
underinsured
or uninsured;
individuals
living in
congregate
settings; and
individuals
attending
colleges or
universities.
Kansas has
defined critical
infrastructure
workforce
personnel to
include
healthcare
personnel and
other essential
workers as
included in the
Cybersecurity
and
Infrastructure
Security
Agency
(CISA) 4.0
guidance
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Kentucky

#

#

#

No

#

Yes

Louisiana

SVI

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

In each
population
group, OPH
will use CDC’s
Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI) or
another more
specific index,
as needed to
prioritize for
geographical
areas for
vaccine access.

Yes

The
Louisiana
COVID-19
Allocation
Tool
apportions
vaccine by
percentages
based on
the
Advisory
Committee
on
Immunizati
on
Practices
(ACIP)
guidance
for priority
groups

No

Maine

#

#

Maine
reviewed
multiple data
sets to identify
and determine
approximate
numbers of
critical
populations.
Data collected
and evaluated
originated
from the
following
resources:
Data and
Dashboards
Team,

No

#

Yes
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KDPH will
utilize the
following
systems to
share
information
and
manage the
COVID-19
vaccination
campaign
(where
applicable):
… Tiberius
(see doc for
full list)
#

Maine
CDC will
use tool
such as the
IIS and
Tiberius to
monitor
vaccine
inventory,
distribution
, and
administrat
ion.
Maine will
utilize the
Tiberius
Platforms

34

Vaccine
Planning Unit,
U.S. CDC.,
Priority 1
Assessment
Hospital
Survey and
Annual
Surveys
facilitated by
the Maine
Immunization
Program
(MIP), nursing
home and
long-term care
facilities
information
from the
Maine
Division of
Licensing and
Regulatory
Services, and
Census data.

Marshall
Islands

#

#

#

No

#

No

to assist in
vaccine
planning,
distribution
and
allocation
efforts.
This will
allow us to
plan
providerlevel orders
across a
range of
distribution
scenarios.
Tiberius
provides
flexible and
databacked
application
s that
enable
users to
make datadriven
decisions.
#

Maryland

#

#

MDH will
work with
other
state/local
agencies, and
previously
identified
partners to
develop
estimates for
groups
identified by
the state (core
planning
group and
technical
advisory
group) and
CDC's
Advisory
Committee on
Immunization

No

#

No

#
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Practices
(ACIP) as
priority for
vaccination
during this
phase

Massachusett
s

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

Using a
variety of
existing data
sets, along
with CDC
COVID-19
guidance on
the three
phases of
vaccine
availability,
recommendati
ons from the
National
Academies of
Sciences,
Engineering,
and Medicine,
and the final
prioritization
of the
Advisory
Committee on
Immunization
Practices,
MDPH will
identify and
prioritize
critical
populations
for vaccination
following
federal
guidance. In
addition,
MDPH will
refer to
emerging
evidence of
historic and
COVID-19specific
vaccine
hesitancy and
underimmunization
risk. Once
critical

No

#
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No

#
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populations
are
enumerated
and mapped,
MDPH will
determine
parameters
and data sets
to inform the
prioritization
model
including
projections,
and requisite
mapping, for
the
distribution of
the vaccine by
phase (and
subsets of
populations
within in each
phase), and by
priority group
and location
The Office of
Population
Health (OPH)
manages the
contract with
Boston
University
School of
Public Health
(BUSPH) for
Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI)
analysis and
related
mapping
support.
Within OPH,
the Office of
Health Equity
(OHE) works
to address
social
determinants
so all
Massachusetts
residents can
attain their full
health
potential.

(December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041

37

MDPH will
engage the
services of a
vendor to
provide
analytical
capacity and
will be
charged with
utilizing U.S.
Census (and
reliable
intercensal
estimates of
populations
conducted by
the University
of
Massachusetts
Donahue
Institute) to
characterize
communities
at the
city/town
level— with
reference to
current trends
in COVID-19
infections—at
the
subpopulation
level
(occupation,
housing type,
school
enrollment,
race/ethnicity,
primary
language,
health care
access, comorbidities,
socioeconomic
factors), and
perform
analysis using
the CDC’s
Social
Vulnerability
Index to assess
the interaction
of these forces
on the
likelihood
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members of
critical
populations
will accept,
seek, and be
able to access
COVID-19
vaccine.

Michigan

SVI

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

Working with
our
collaborative
Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI)
analytic and
mapping
partner, the
Boston
University
School of
Public Health,
maintain
superior
ability to map
these
workforce
resources at a
granular level
to inform
planning.
Thereafter,
allocations will
be made to
each of the
health
jurisdictions
within
Michigan for
prioritization
to community
providers who
have the
ability to
vaccinate the
priority
groups.
Allocations are
determined
based on
several factors
including the
social
vulnerability
index and
population.

No

#
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No

#
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Micronesia

#

#

After initial
allocations to
hospitals,
allocations will
be made to
each of the 45
health
jurisdictions
based on
several factors
including the
social
vulnerability
index and
population.
LHDs will
then use the
relationships
they have built
with the
community to
allocate out
additional
amounts of
vaccine to the
providers in
their
community
who are able
to reach the
vulnerable
populations.
#

Minnesota

#

#

#

No

#

No

#

Mississippi

#

#

#

No

#

Yes

To
improve
vaccination
among
critical
population
groups,
MSDH has
and will
work to

No

#

No

#
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ensure that
these
groups
have access
to
vaccination
services.
MSDH will
work
internally
using
mapping
tools
provided
by NORC,
CMS and
Operation
Warp
Speed
(OWS)
Tiberius to
create
visual maps
of these
populations
, including
places of
employmen
t for the
critical
infrastructu
re
workforce
category, to
assist in
COVID-19
vaccination
clinic
planning.
In addition,
MSDH will
use
Tiberius to
inform this
effort to
ensure
maximum
administrat
ion
distribution
and/or low
vaccination
coverage
rates to
ensure
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maximum
administrat
ion
distribution
is available
to all
populations
identified
in each
phase
MSDH will
monitor
baseline
data
against
coverage
and
distribution
data
throughout
the effort
through
OWS
Tiberius to
identify any
gaps in
coverage
and
distribution
.
MSDH will
use
Tiberius,
the U.S.
Departmen
t of Health
& Human
Services
(HHS)
Operation
Warp
Speed
Protect
(OWS)
ecosystem
of data
sharing
platforms
that
connects
data
sources for
analysis
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and
modeling.

Missouri

#

#

DHSS
obtained
estimated
numbers of
priority groups
for COVID19 vaccination
using data
from the
Bureau of
Labor and
Statistics,
DHSS, CDC
mapping tools,
Missouri
Economic
Research and
Information
Center
(MERIC), and
Missouri
Department of
Economic
Development.
DHSS sent
county-level
tier sheets to
each Local
Public Health
Agency
(LPHA) for
completion,
with 14% of
LPHAs not

No

#
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Tiberius
will assist
MSDH in
analyzing
coverage
level across
the state.
This
information
will inform
next steps
and further
provider
recruitment
and
enrollment,
throughout
the effort.
#
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N. Mariana
Islands

#

#

Montana

#

#

Nebraska

#

#

returning tier
sheets. Many
of the
produced
sheets had
missing or
apparent
inaccurate
data.
Members of
the planning
team have
reached out to
those who did
not return the
document or
had missing
data. Statelevel data are
included
below. The
maps in
Appendix D
will consist of
locations of
priority groups
by county.
#

No

#

No

#

Determination
for critical
populations
for mass
vaccination is
comes from
CDC
guidance,
Montana data,
Montana
University
resources, and
other DPHHS
information.

No

#

No

#

Nebraska
DHHS will
use the
American
Community
Survey (ACS)

No

#

No

#
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to arrive at
population
estimates by
county of
vulnerable
populations
stratified by
age group,
gender, race,
and ethnicity.
The ACS will
be further
leveraged to
arrive at
estimates for
individuals
incarcerated/
detained in
correctional
facilities,
individuals
experiencing
homelessness/
living in
shelters,
college/univer
sity
enrollment,
people living
in other
congregate
settings such
as treatment
facilities and
military
barracks, and
people with
disabilities.

Nevada

#

#

#

N/A

#

Yes

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

#

#

#

N/A

#

No

SVI

Plan dispensing
sites

Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI)3
review to
determine
location of
PODS sites

#

#

Yes
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Limited
Doses
Received in
Tiberius
#
New Jersey
will receive
a
Tiberius
Analytic
Support
subject
matter
expert to
optimize
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New Mexico

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

NMDOH will
also use
numerous
data sources,
including the
CDC’s Social
Vulnerability
Index to
identify
populations at
highest risk.

N/A

#

Yes

New York

Unspecified
if SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

In addition,
individual
factors for
hospitals and
nursing homes
will be
considered
including cases

N/A

#

No
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New
Jersey’s use
of data
monitoring
available
through
federal
systems.
Mapping
will provide
visualizatio
n of
vaccine
coverage
for the state
by provider
type,
vaccine
type, and
population
type.
NMDOH
is interested
in using the
Operation
Warp
Speed
(OWS)
Tiberius
platform
for the
critical
population
identificatio
n. We do,
however,
want to
ensure that
more
detailed,
and
potentially
more
accurate,
New
Mexico
data is
used.
#
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per facility in
prior 14 days,
and
vulnerability
index of
population
served. New
York will also
consider
whether the
vaccine can be
used
effectively as a
potential
outbreak
interruption
strategy and if
so, what the
criteria will be.
New York
City
North
Carolina

#

#

#

N/A

#

No

#

#

#

#

N/A

#

Yes

Ordering
will be
allocated at
the state
level during
the
Implement
ation
Phase. It is
anticipated
that during
Phase 1, a
limited
supply of
vaccine will
be
available.
Using
existing
interoperab
le uploads
of vaccine
orders into
the CDC’s
Vaccine
Order
Tracking
System
(VTrckS)
and
Tiberius; a
seamless,
secure, and
access-
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controlled
collaborati
on across
all
governmen
t agencies
and teams
relevant to
the
Operation
Warp
Speed
(OWS)
COVID-19
vaccine
effort,
including
federal
agencies
and state
health
department
s, will be
used to
estimate
vaccine
allocation.
The
Tiberius
platform
integrates
data
concerning
COVID-19
vaccine
clinical trial
operations,
manufactur
ing,
allocation,
ordering,
distribution
, inventory,
and
populationlevel
administrat
ion to
provide
OWS with
a real-time
understand
ing of the
effort.
Tiberius
allows users
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North Dakota

SVI

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

The ND
Advisory
Committee on
COVID-19
Vaccine Ethics
may choose to
utilize CDC’s
vulnerability
index when
allocating
vaccine, which
may ensure
equity in the
number of
doses Tribal
healthcare
providers
receive.

N/A

#

Yes

Ohio

SVI

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

In addition,
vaccine
administration
will be
assessed using
the CDC’s
Social
Vulnerability
Index both a
priori when
deciding
geographic
distribution of

N/A

#

No

Monitor
uptake
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to better
understand
and
support
exploring
and
analyzing
key
COVID-19
metrics and
forecasts
from
multiple
governmen
t and
academic
modeling
groups to
support
bespoke
federal
governmen
t
workflows.
North
Dakota
intends to
use the
federal
Tiberius
platform,
which will
provide
data from a
variety of
sources to
inform
allocation
decision
making and
monitor the
impact of
allocations.
#
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Oregon

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

Oklahoma
Palau

#
#

#
#

vaccines and
post-hoc to
ensure that
state’s goals to
protect the
most-at-risk
and vulnerable
Ohioans are
upheld.
Options for
mapping
population
data (including
Tiberius,
Tableau and
ArcGIS) are
actively being
explored in
conjunction
with mapping
of CDC’s
Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI) to
identify
overlap and
potential areas
of greatest
need.

#
#

N/A

#

Yes

N/A
Yes

#
Targeting
population
groups for
vaccine 1st

No
No

Options for
mapping
population
data
(including
Tiberius,
Tableau
and
ArcGIS)
are actively
being
explored in
conjunction
with
mapping of
CDC’s
Social
Vulnerabili
ty Index
(SVI) to
identify
overlap and
potential
areas of
greatest
need.
#
#

batch (2nd
batch: 2
weeks later,
same
operations
for 2nd
dose)

Governme
ntal
decision
makers and
mission
essential
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personnel:
150
MOH and
private
clinics
personnel:
550
First
Responder
and critical
governmen
t personnel:
340
Children 318 years
old with
high risk
condition:
150
Adults 1964 years
old with
high risk
condition:

Pennsylvania

#

#

#

N/A

Adults 65
and older:
1300
#

Philadelphia

#

#

Prioritization
of different
critical
populations
was
established
using a formal
risk assessment
tool. PDPH is
employing
both primary

N/A

#
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Yes

No

It’s
anticipated
DOH will
rely heavily
on the
CDC’s
Tiberius
software in
order to
identify
relevant
data.
#
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Puerto Rico

#

#

Rhode Island

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

and secondary
data collection
methods to
define and
estimate
numbers of
persons in
each of the
critical
population
groups.
#

The MV
Workgroup
will leverage a
range of data
sources to
estimate
numbers of
critical
populations
throughout
Rhode Island.
As new
guidance and
evidence
identifies
additional
population
groups at
increased risk
of
susceptibility
or of severe
illness, the
MV
Workgroup
will work to
identify their
numbers and

N/A

#

Yes

N/A

#

Yes
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The PR
Immunizati
on
Program
will employ
the HHS
Tiberius
Analytic
Support
software to
produce
vaccination
reports and
generate a
dashboard
capability if
applicable.
Rhode
Island will
seek to
leverage its
existing
COVID-19
information
collection
and sharing
processes to
the
maximum
extent
possible to
support the
COVID-19
vaccination
campaign.
Available
information
collection
processes
include
(though are
not limited
to):
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locations. The
COVID-19
Vaccine
Subcommittee
will further
support this
effort by
facilitating
engagement
with key
stakeholders
and providing
subject- matter
expertise and
guidance.

Monitoring
RICAIR,
PrepMod,
OSMOSSI
S, VAERS,
Tiberius,
VaccineFin
der

Data sources
consulted in
the process of
quantifying
and locating
members of
critical
populations
include
(though are
not limited to):
-

-

Feder
al
agenc
y
data
to
CMS
CDC
Socia
l
Vuln
erabil
ity
Index

San Antonio

#

#

#

N/A

#

No

#

South
Carolina

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing

CDC
COVID-19
Vaccination
Plan Template
Section 4A:
Describe how
your
jurisdiction
plans to: 1)

N/A

#

No

#
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identify, 2)
estimate
numbers of,
and 3) locate
(e.g., via
mapping)
critical
populations.
DHEC is
closely
monitoring
guidance put
forth by the
CDC's
Advisory
Committee on
Immunization
Practices
(ACIP), the
National
Institutes of
Health, and
the National
Academies of
Sciences,
Engineering,
and Medicine
(NASEM)
regarding
identified
populations of
focus for
COVID-19
vaccination.
Other
resources
include:

South Dakota

#

#

CDC's Social
Vulnerability
Index, which
accounts for
natural and
human-caused
disasters and
disease
outbreaks.
SDDOH will
incorporate a
variety of data
sources from
both state and
federal data
repositories to
determine the

N/A

#
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Yes

SDDOH
will
monitor
progress of
COVID-19
vaccination
program to
include
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number of
individuals
with each
critical
population

Tennessee

SVI

Prioritize worse
off using SVI

After careful
review of the
CDC
Playbook and
the National
Academies’ of
Sciences,
Engineering
and
Medicine’s
Framework
for Equitable
Allocation of
COVID-19
Vaccine and
discussion with
the
Stakeholder
Group, TDH
leadership,
and the
Unified
Command
Group, the
following
structure has
been adopted
for the
allocation and

10% allocated to
worse off groups

10% of the
State’s
allocation
of COVID19 vaccines
will be
reserved by
the State
for use in
targeted
areas with
high
vulnerabilit
y to
morbidity
and
mortality
from the
virus
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Yes

provider
enrollment,
access to
vaccine,
dose
administere
d through
SDIIS,
vaccine
ordering
and
distribution
, as well as
data
reporting
to CDC.
SDDOH
will use
multiple
platforms
such as
SDIIS,
Tiberius,
Qualtrics,
VtrackS,
among
others.
TDH plans
to utilize
state and
national
data
sources,
CDC’s
Tiberius
application,
and
Geographic
Informatio
n System
(GIS)
mapping to
locate and
map
identified
critical
populations
in
Tennessee,
including
health care
personnel
and other
essential
workers,
residents
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prioritization
of COVID-19
vaccines:

and staff of
congregate
care
facilities,
individuals
with
underlying
medical
conditions,
or of age,
disability,
racial, and
ethnic
minority
groups or
other
vulnerable
populations
, that place
them at
higher risk
for severe
COVID-19
illness and
death.

Allocation:
Ten percent of
the State’s
allocation of
COVID-19
vaccines will
be reserved by
the State for
use in targeted
areas with
high Social
Vulnerability
Index (SVI)
values.
Five percent of
the State’s
allocation of
COVID-19
vaccines will
be distributed
equitably
among all 95
counties.

Texas
United States
Virgin Islands

#
#

#
#

Eighty-five
percent of the
State’s
allocation of
COVID-19
vaccines will
be distributed
among all 95
counties based
upon their
populations.
#
VIDOH will
use a twoprong strategy
for identifying,
estimating,
and locating
critical
populations of
the 106,405
people living
in USVI. This
will involve
reviewing
existing data

N/A
N/A

#
#
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No

#
#
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sources for
identifying
and estimating
critical
populations,
then validating
data of critical
populations
with
stakeholder
engagement.
This process
will also
ensure
effective
communicatio
n and
outreach over
the entire
course of the
vaccine
operation.

Utah

#

#

The UIP will
utilize several
different data
sources to
identify,
estimate, and
locate the
critical
populations of
Utah
residents, such
as (but not
limited to) the
Behavioral
Risk Factor
Surveillance
Survey, Long
Term Care
Report, and
US Census
data. The UIP
has also
created
surveys that
will gather
more local and
hospital/clinic
data. This
data will help
the UIP and
PW determine
which

N/A

#
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No

#
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populations
will receive the
vaccine first
and will help
estimate how
many vaccines
these
populations
will need.

Vermont

SVI

Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing
Plan outreach/
communication
to ensure
uptake (during
scarcity or
after)

The
Immunization
Program will
work closely
with all
COVID-19
vaccination
providers and
target settings
to ensure
equitable
access to the
COVID-19
vaccine.
Vaccine
allocation will
be based on
population
data, with
attention to
critical
populations.
Vaccine
administration
data from the
Immunization
Registry will
be monitored
and reviewed
by geographic
location.
Vaccine doses
administered
by enrolled
sites will also
be monitored
and
redistribution
will be
required. The
Immunization
Program is
collaborating
with the
Health

N/A

#
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No

#

58

Operations
Center’s
Health Equity
and
Community
Engagement
Team to
ensure access
for people who
are
disproportiona
tely affected
by COVID19, including
Black,
Indigenous
and people of
color. GIS
mapping and
Social
Vulnerability
Indices will be
employed to
identify areas
with limited
access and
direct
distribution
efforts.

Virginia
Washington

#
SVI

#
Define priority
groups,
possibly also
prioritizing
Plan outreach/
communication
to ensure
uptake (during
scarcity or
after)

#
The use of
social
vulnerability
indexes and
maps will also
inform how
critical
populations
and subpopulations
can be
reached
equitably and
will inform
allocation
decisions
under supply
constraints.
We will use
tools such as
Washington
Tracking
Network
Information

N/A
N/A

#
#
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#
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West Virginia
Wisconsin

#
#

#
#

Wyoming

#

#

and CDC
Social
Vulnerability
Index to
identify
Census tracts
in Washington
that have
higher health
inequities
overall and to
map other
relevant social
determinants
of health, such
as
overcrowded
housing,
poverty,
disability, or
health
insurance
coverage.
#
a tool will be
developed to
take the main
principles into
consideration,
as well as
other relevant
data (e.g.,
county
population,
percentage of
a particular
subgroup,
vaccinator
ability to store
that particular
vaccine).

#

N/A
N/A

#
#

No
Yes

N/A

#

Yes
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#
DPH will
data from a
number of
sources,
including
the
Wisconsin
provider
registration
system, the
WIR, the
CDC
program
used for
vaccine
distribution
, VTrckS,
and the
federal
database
Tiberius to
produce
reports for
internal
and
external
use.
The
Immunizati
on Unit
will utilize
a variety of
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tools to
determine
allocation
amounts
and
locations in
early and
limited
supply
scenarios.
Tools will
include the
use of
Tiberius
and data
collected
through the
Provider
Profiles for
enrolled
providers.
Allocations
will first be
prioritized
for
hospitals,
PHNOs,
CHDs, and
Eastern
Shoshone
Tribal
Health to
ensure
access for
critical
populations
, including
healthcare
workers
and others
identified
by CDC,
ACIP and
in
considerati
on of
recommen
dations
from the
Wyoming
Medical
Ethics
Committee
.
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Appendix 2 – Data on quantifying shares of worse-off populations and the impact
of statistical measures of disadvantage to adjust allocations
At the time the NASEM recommended setting aside a 10% national reserve to be allocated to
worse-off populations as captured under SVI, it was unclear what quantitative impact this would
have in terms of the numbers of doses offered to these communities. To quantify this, we
simulated using SVI along a modified version of the index that reduced legal challenges, and
another index that likewise reduces this risk (the Area Deprivation Index, ADI).1 The figure
below shows on the left-hand side the consequences of setting aside 10% at the state-level (the
more realistic approach, see the example of Tennessee, noted in the manuscript) of the amount
allocated to states based on population and adding this in addition to the share that a states’
worse-off quartile as captured on the respective index would receive. The right-hand side shows
the consequences of doubling this amount to 20%, which can also give a rough2 idea of what a
combined 10% reserve at the national level, and at the state level would mean.
The share of the worse-off quartile among minority populations that would be offered vaccines
under the unadjusted NASEM framework in shown in the gray line. In the initial phase, all
indices would offer worse-off minorities vaccines above their population share, even though in
the case of the unadjusted NASEM framework the margin is slim, and considerably higher on
the different indices. Around half-way through phase 1, using only the state-level 10% reserve
(left-hand side illustration), on all scenarios the share of offered vaccines drops below the
population share, while increasing the reserve size to 20% leads to offers that are consistently
above the population share. Note also the shares of covid-related deaths (crude and ageadjusted) of all minority populations collectively, that are shown for context on the vertical axis.
Further, note that the standardized assumptions made here set aside logistical complexities of
implementation, that likely make it harder, rather than easier to reach worse-off groups.
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The US’s states do not have equal shares of worse-off populations. Figure 1 shows what share of
each state’s population falls into the nation’s worse-off quartile, varying from 36% (NM) to 12%
(NH).3 In 16 ‘Increased Competition’ states, the worse-off group accounts for more than 25% of
its population: allocating vaccine proportionate to population would increase scarcity for these
populations.
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preferable over no adjustment, see: Schmidt, Harald and Pathak, Parag A. and Williams, Michelle A.
and Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Unver, Utku and Gostin, Lawrence O., Rationing safe and effective
Covid-19 vaccines: allocating to states proportionate to population may undermine commitments to
mitigating health disparities (November 12, 2020). Available at
SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3729069
(December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041

63

3

Schmidt, Harald and Pathak, Parag A. and Williams, Michelle A. and Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Unver, Utku
and Gostin, Lawrence O., Rationing safe and effective Covid-19 vaccines: allocating to states proportionate to
population may undermine commitments to mitigating health disparities (November 12, 2020). Available at
SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3729069

(December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740041

64

